Blockchain & zkEVM Security

Auditing DLTs at the
bit level.

Formal verification, advanced fuzzing, and AI as a force multiplier. We audit distributed ledgers, zkEVMs, and the protocols built on them.

Helped Secure
Ethereum
zkSync
Solana
Stacks
Optimism
Starknet
Scroll
Sui
Polkadot

Three pillars of
deep security

Every engagement combines mathematical proof, adversarial testing, and AI-driven analysis across consensus layers, zkEVM circuits, and application logic.

Formal Verification

We mathematically prove your protocol behaves exactly as specified. That means verifying zkProof soundness, state transition integrity, bridge logic, and cross-layer invariants against your spec.

Advanced Fuzzing

We run business logic guided fuzz campaigns targeting rollup sequencers, prover edge cases, and DLT networking layers. Millions of randomized inputs probing consensus boundaries and circuit constraints.

AI as a Force Multiplier

Our auditors leverage custom-trained models to parse DLT consensus mechanisms, zkEVM proof circuits, and execution layers at the bytecode level, pattern-matching across thousands of known exploit vectors.

From code to confidence

Our systematic audit process covers every layer of your blockchain stack.

01
Scope
Map the full stack: DLT layer, zkEVM circuits, bridges, and application logic
02
Scan
AI + static analysis across consensus, proof systems, and execution layers
03
Prove
Formal verification confirms or refutes each finding
04
Stress
Fuzz testing attacks prover edge cases, sequencer logic, and protocol boundaries

One packet to take down a network

We don't just audit your code. We audit every dependency in your stack, tracing execution paths through third-party libraries that most teams never look at. That's where the worst bugs hide.

Deep in Quinn, a Rust QUIC library buried in the dependency tree of Ethereum clients, Solana validators, Sui, Polkadot, and others, we found CVE-2026-31812: a single malformed UDP packet could crash any node on these networks. No authentication. No handshake. One packet, process dead.

An attacker could have systematically taken down a significant portion of nodes across multiple major blockchains simultaneously. We found it, reported it through the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program, and it was patched before anyone could exploit it.

transport_parameters.rs — vulnerable code quinn-proto 0.11.13
471let tag = Tag::decode(&mut reader)
472 .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed)?;
473let len = VarInt::decode(&mut reader)
474 .unwrap()
⚠ CRITICAL: unwrap() on fallible decode — panics on truncated input
475 .into_inner() as usize;
// ── Moon AI fix ──
473let len = VarInt::decode(&mut reader)
474 .map_err(|_| Error::Malformed)?
✓ FIX: propagate error instead of panic
475 .into_inner() as usize;

Secure your protocol.

Ship with confidence. Talk to our team about a comprehensive DLT and zkEVM security audit before your next deployment.

Request Audit →